The aim of this paper is to present a novel reading of Kantian idealism. In want of a better name, I call my interpretation “one-object-plus-epistemic phenomenalism”. I partially endorse Allison’s celebrated position, namely his rejection of metaphysical world-dualism. Yet, I reject Allison’s deflationary two-aspect view. I argue that Kantian idealism is also metaphysically committed to an ontological noumenalism (one-object), namely the claim that the ultimate nature of reality is made up of unknown things in themselves (substantia noumena). Natural sciences can (...) only reveal the relational/structural properties of things as they appear rather than the intrinsic properties of substantia noumena in the negative sense. My anti-deflationary reading is similar to Allais’s, and my agnostic monism to Hanna’s. However, against both, I hold that appearances are not the accusative objects of our sensible representations, but rather, as Kant repeatedly states: “mere representations”. The accusative objects of our senses are substantia noumena in the negative sense. Moreover, my view is also similar to Langton’s. Again, against Langton, I hold that appearances are not merely relational properties of substantia noumena but the way that such substantia noumena exist inside our mind as “mere representations”. In this regard, I also partially endorse Guyer’s and Van Cleve’s phenomenalist reading because these substantia noumena in the negative sense can only be cognized mind-dependently, namely as appearances. However, against Guyer and Van Cleve, I hold that the phenomenalist side of Kantian idealism is purely epistemological rather than ontological: what Kant calls the necessary unity of representations according to categories is not a logical construction of objects out of representations, that is, an ontological reduction of noumena to appearances, but rather the way we sense-independently cognize mind-independent noumena. (shrink)

In this paper, I present a new interpretation of Kant’s notion of consciousness of oneself as a Subject on behalf of a polemic with a recent reading suggested by Longuenesse. My central aim is to provide a systematic interpretation of Kant’s metaphysics of consciousness in general. I present and defend new interpretations for four capital Kant’s notions. First, I present a reading of Kant’s sensible intuition as a de re form of mental representation without conceptual content and any structure. It (...) makes the subject aware only in the limited sense of demonstratively representing what appears to him. In the sequence, I present a reading of empirical consciousness as the result of a first-order representation. The important introduction of §16 of the first Critique is construed here as expressing what is known today as the access consciousness. Lastly, I propose a new reading for the transcendental Apperception as an intransitive form of consciousness. (shrink)

From the second half of the last century, there has been a widespread view in the Anglophone world that Kant’s transcendental deduction (aka TD) aims to vindicate our common-sense view of the world as composed of public and objective particulars against some unqualified forms of skepticism. This widespread assumption has raised serious doubt not only about the success of TD but also about the very nature of its argument in both editions of the Critique. Yet, if there is a connection (...) between TD and global skepticism, the intriguing question is: Who is this skeptic? According to Strawson, “the skeptic” is a hypothesis of a purely sense-datum experience. In contrast, the fact that TD turns on the key notion of self-consciousness has induced several other scholars to assume that the skeptic is no none but a Cartesian external-world skeptic. None of those readings find textual support or are compatible with the very structure of the first Critique. The question is: Does this mean that TD aims only to undermine empiricism, as Guyer suggests? I do not believe so. I am pretty convinced that TD addresses a peculiar form of global skepticism, namely “Hume’s challenge to reason.” Assuming that we cognize (erkennen) and experience (erfahren) appearances as objects as a requirement of Newtonian physics, TD aims to provide a justification of the principle that nature is uniform that is superior to Hume’s justification. (shrink)

The claim that ―concepts serve as rules for the synthesis of representations‖ is understood by the mainstream of Kant‘s scholarship as if categories and concepts, in general, are conditions for the constitution of objects out of the manifold of sensations devoid of reference. That is the claim that I wish to question here. The claim comes in different flavors and formulations. Still, none of them are relevant here. I aim to provide an alternative account for the claim that ―the representation (...) makes the object possible.‖ I argue that the traditional view represents a solution to what I call the pseudo-problem of intentionality, namely to account for how a representation of something emerges out of a manifold of sensations devoid of reference. Yet, the intentionality problem is a misunderstanding of what I call the recognition thesis: the role of concepts is to provide the rules for the (mind-dependent) recognition (Erkenntnis) of the mind-independent existence of transcendental objects (noumena). ―The representation makes the object possible in the relevant sense that only by means of concepts can we recognize that what is sense-dependently represented actually exists mind-independently as transcendental objects or noumena in the negative sense. My view is embedded in the framework of what today is called ―Kantian Nonceptualism‖. Still, my view is neither a simple re-statement of Kantian Nonconceptualism nor depends on it. It is independently grounded on what Kant calls ―Erkenntnis‖. (shrink)

This paper is a new defense of type-B materialism against Jackson’s knowledge argument (1982) inspired by the Kantian main opposition between concepts and sensible intuitions. Like all materialists of type B, I argue that on her release from her black-and-white room, Mary makes cognitive progress. However, contrary to the so-called phenomenal concept strategy (henceforth PCS), I do not think that such progress can be accounted for in terms of the acquisition of new concepts. I also reject Tye’s recent account of (...) Mary’s cognitive progress as the acquisition of a “thing-knowledge.” What is crucial is not the Russellian opposition between knowing things and knowing truths but rather the Kantian opposition between conceptual and nonconceptual representations of the same thing (property). Mary’s phenomenal knowledge is here accounted for as the result of the cooperation of her newly acquired nonconceptual representation of the same phenomenal redness (the same thing) she had a conceptual representation before. As that new nonconceptual representation carries information about the same physical property she already represented but is now coded in analog rather than in digital form (Dretske, 1981), that nonconceptual representation can be accounted for in physical terms as Chalmers’s Master argument requires. Nevertheless, that representation can account for Mary’s cognitive progress since it carries information coded in analog form, something that the imprisoned she could never possess. (shrink)

In this critical review of Robert Hanna's ingenious book (2006), I aim to support Hanna‟s main insightful reading of Kant, namely what he calls “a priori truth with a human face," without appealing to Kant's divide between a priori and a posteriori and analytic and synthetic truths. My suggestion is that transcendental propositions are necessary neither in the usual epistemological sense that analytic propositions are, let alone in the metaphysical sense that some empirical propositions are. Instead, they are necessary in (...) the theoretical domain in the weak alternative sense that they make possible the empirical recognition of appearances as an object as an indispensable condition of our self-consciousness experience, and they are a priori in the practical domain in the sense that their truth is vital for our self-comprehension as human beings. (shrink)

This paper aims to present a novel reading of Kantian idealism. In want of a better name, I call my interpretation “one-object-plus-epistemic phenomenalism.” I partially endorse Allison’s celebrated position, namely his rejection of metaphysical world-dualism. Yet, I reject Allison’s deflationary two-aspect view. I argue that Kantian idealism is also metaphysically committed to an ontological noumenalism (one-object), namely the claim that the ultimate nature of reality is made up of unknown things in themselves (substantia noumena). Natural sciences can only reveal the (...) relational/structural properties of things as they appear rather than the intrinsic properties of substantia noumena in the negative sense. My anti-deflationary reading is similar to Allais’s, and my agnostic monism to Hanna’s. However, against both, I hold that appearances are not the accusative objects of our sensible representations but rather, as Kant repeatedly states: “mere representations.” The accusative objects of our senses are substantia noumena in the negative sense. Moreover, my view is also similar to Langton’s. Again, against Langton, I hold that appearances are not merely relational properties of substantia noumena but the way that such substantia noumena exist inside our mind as “mere representations.” In this regard, I also partially endorse Guyer’s and Van Cleve’s phenomenalist reading because these substantia noumena in the negative sense can only be cognized mind-dependently, namely as appearances. However, against Guyer and Van Cleve, I hold that the phenomenalist side of Kantian idealism is purely epistemological rather than ontological: what Kant calls the necessary unity of representations according to categories is not a logical construction of objects out of representations, that is, an ontological reduction of noumena to appearances, but rather the way we sense-independently cognize mind-independent noumena. (shrink)

Une grande partie du livre Kitāb al-inṣāf d’Avicenne ne nous est pas parvenue. Toutefois, le «paraphrase-commentaire » ayant trait à la Métaphysique d’Aristote, livre Lambda, chapitres 6-10 a été conservé dans deux manuscrits. En 1948 Badawi avait fourni une édition du texte arabe, qui, malgré ses mérites, est ouverte à des corrections importantes, comme le démontrent quelques exemples. En outre, une attention particulière est payée au problème de l’identification de la traduction utilisée par Avicenne. Un examen, bien que non exhaustif, (...) de différents cas donne à penser qu’il s’agit d’une version révisée de la traduction d’Usāth. Mais il est à noter qu’Avicenne n’hésite pas de modifier de temps à temps la terminologie en fonction de sa propre pensée. Enfin, des éléments novateurs se font jour, dont au moins deux s’expliquent par les particularités de la traduction arabe. Au niveau doctrinal, trois éléments de telle sorte ressortissent : 1. le rejet d’inclure l’argument du Premier moteur immobile comme preuve de Dieu dans un contexte métaphysique ; 2. la qualification de la dépendance de l’univers envers le Premier Principe en termes de « don d’être » , non de mouvement ; enfin, 3. l’affirmation que l’auto-connaissance du Premier Principe inclut la connaissance de toutes les choses.A large part of Avicenna’s Kitāb al-inṣāf has been lost. However, the section containing a « paraphrasis-commentary » of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, book Lambda, chapters 6-10, has reached us in two manuscripts. Badawi, in 1948, has offered a printed edition that notwithstanding its merits is open to serious improvement as shown by several examples. Furthermore, the problem of which of the old Arabic translation Avicenna has used is dealt with in detail. The examined cases, although limited in number, point to a revised version of Ustāth’s translation. But it has to be noted that Avicenna now and then changes the terminology consciously in view of his own ideas. Finally, some innovative elements come to the fore, two of which, at least, are due to particularities of the Arabic translation. From the doctrinal point of view, three ideas do strike: 1. the fact that the proof of the Unmoved Mover is unacceptable in a metaphysical context; 2. the qualification of the dependence of the Universe on the First Principle as a “Gift of Being” , not as a motion; 3. the inclusion of the knowledge of all things in God’s self-knowledge. (shrink)

South Africa has been undergoing a process of transformation since the end of White minority rule in 1994. During this period, various employment and lifestyle opportunities have given rise to a growing Black middle class. Against this backdrop, the article draws upon an intersectional approach to corpus-assisted discourse studies in order to examine the construction of the BMC in a 1.4 million-word corpus composed of 20 mainstream Anglophone South African newspaper titles published between 2008 and 2014. With the help of (...) the corpus tool AntConc, the article investigates the collocates of ‘black middle class’, ‘black diamonds’, ‘clever blacks’ and ‘coconuts’, classifying results according to semantic categories in order to provide an idea of the multiple but nuanced representations of the BMC in contemporary SA. The analysis finds several lexically rich moralizing and paternalistic discourses that, in accordance with an intersectional perspective, enact a complex pattern of strategies that are simultaneously exclusionary and inclusionary. (shrink)

Journal Name: Semiotica Issue: Ahead of print.

Index to the Praśastapādabhāṣya, Vaiśeṣika school in Hindu philosophy by Praśastapādācārya; includes a portion of the text.

Leibniz’s letter to Magnus Wedderkopf (probably of May 1671) has been misunderstood due to the neglection of Wedderkopf ’s preceding inquiry, which had been available in print in the series I of the Academy edition. The letter is so interesting because Leibniz has already applied in it elements of his arguments which he later uses to solve the theodicy problem.

MOHAMMED SA, WALTERS KL, LAMARR J, EVANS‐CAMPBELL T and FRYBERG S. Nursing Inquiry 2012; 19: 116–127 [Epub ahead of print]Finding middle ground: negotiating university and tribal community interests in community‐based participatory researchCommunity‐based participatory research (CBPR) has been hailed as an alternative approach to one‐sided research endeavors that have traditionally been conducted on communities as opposed to with them. Although CBPR engenders numerous relationship strengths, through its emphasis on co‐sharing, mutual benefit, and community capacity building, it is often challenging as well. (...) In this article, we describe some of the challenges of implementing CBPR in a research project designed to prevent cardiovascular disease among an indigenous community in the Pacific Northwest of the United States and how we addressed them. Specifically, we highlight the process of collaboratively constructing a Research Protocol/Data Sharing Agreement and qualitative interview guide that addressed the concerns of both university and tribal community constituents. Establishing these two items was a process of negotiation that required: (i) balancing of individual, occupational, research, and community interests; (ii) definition of terminology (e.g., ownership of data); and (iii) extensive consideration of how to best protect research participants. Finding middle ground in CBPR requires research partners to examine and articulate their own assumptions and expectations, and nurture a relationship based on compromise to effectively meet the needs of each group. (shrink)

As is well known, the Kāśikāvṛtti is the oldest extant rule-by-rule commentary on the Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini. Two major commentaries on it are available, the Nyāsa from the eighth century and the Padamañjarī, most likely from the eleventh century. In this article we focus on the term pradeśa, which is a familiar feature of the printed editions of the Kāśikāvṛtti on the sañjñā sūtras of the Aṣṭādhyāyī. A closer examination, however, shows that the sentence “Xpradeśāḥ — X... ity evamādayaḥ” is (...) not met with in either of the two commentaries. This has consequences for our understanding of the textual transmission of the Kāśikāvṛtti. (shrink)

Introduction: philosophy of science in practice Content Type Journal Article Category Editorial Article Pages 303-307 DOI 10.1007/s13194-011-0036-4 Authors Rachel Ankeny, School of History & Politics, University of Adelaide, Napier Building, The University of Adelaide, Adelaide, SA 5005, Australia Hasok Chang, Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Cambridge, Free School Lane, Cambridge, CB2 3RH UK Marcel Boumans, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Amsterdam, Valckenierstraat 65-67, 1018 XE Amsterdam, The Netherlands Mieke Boon, Department of Philosophy, University of (...) Twente, Postbox 217, 7500 AE Enschede, The Netherlands Journal European Journal for Philosophy of Science Online ISSN 1879-4920 Print ISSN 1879-4912 Journal Volume Volume 1 Journal Issue Volume 1, Number 3. (shrink)

What’s Darwin got to do with it? The role of evolutionary theory in psychiatry Content Type Journal Article Category Review Essay Pages 1-12 DOI 10.1007/s10539-011-9301-3 Authors Ian Ravenscroft, Philosophy Department, Flinders University, Adelaide, SA, Australia Journal Biology and Philosophy Online ISSN 1572-8404 Print ISSN 0169-3867.

Irréductiblement polysémique, l'appellation «littérature populaire» a pu désigner les «littératures de la voix», la littérature de colportage, ou encore les fictions imprimées de grande consommation. Dans tous les cas, les «littératures populaires» ont été opiniâtrement minorées par le canon culturel. Sans doute parce que, par-delà les alibis esthétiques, la condamnation des «mauvais genres» trahit l'inquiétude des élites face aux conséquences de la démocratie, en même temps que le déclassement de la «littérature industrielle» permet à la Littérature consacrée d'affirmer par contraste (...) sa singularité distinctive. On s'interrogera dès lors sur les logiques de champs dont la recherche universitaire est redevable, comme en témoigne la persistance de dichotomies notionnelles discriminantes, que l'hybridité des textes et des usages sociaux invalide pourtant constamment.Popular literature, a definitely polysemous form applies to types of literature involving voices, hawking, or else the printed fictions widely read since the advent of the serialized novel. In all cases, popular literature or popular types of literature have systematically been minimized by the cultural canon. Beyond the alleged aesthetic reasons, this condemnation of "irrelevant genres" betrays the elites' worried reaction to democracy and its consequences; at the same time, the downgrading of "industrial literature" contributes to conversely reinforcing the distinctive status of established and accepted Literature. How can one then justify the fields academic research is indebted to, as is shown by the enduring discriminatory notional dichotomies which are however constantly gainsaid by the hybrid nature of texts and by social habits? (shrink)

Constructing Race on the Borders of Europe investigates the visual imagery (in painting, photography, prints, film, and design) of race construction primarily in Scandinavia and the empires of Austro-Hungary, Germany, and Russia at a time when the disciplines of ethnography and anthropology were expanding and publications on race were debating competing theories of biological, geographic, linguistic, and cultural determinants. These regions, while on the periphery of continental Europe, largely marginalized in the scholarship of nineteenth-century art history, and ignored by Edward (...) Said (Orientalism 1978), have been central locations for theorizing white identity and for containing diverse ethnic populations that have generated substantive ethnographic study and regional conflicts since the eighteenth century. This anthology explores art that engaged with ethnography and anthropology to shape visual representations of subordinate ethnic populations and material cultures, both indigenous (Roma, Sámi, Inuit, and Celts) and migrant or colonial (Muslims and Blacks), chiefly between 1850 and 1930, but extending into the early twenty-first century. The essays in this book contribute to postcolonial research by documenting colonial-style treatment of minority groups and by seeking to qualify binary systems through explorations of anomalies, complexities, and contradictions that emerge when seen from the perspective of the fine and applied arts. This book presents a range of different artistic voices that responded to ethnographic and anthropological information by producing images or objects that adopted, altered, or critiqued that information. The authors seek to uncover instances of connections and variability, to establish the fabricated nature of ethnic identity, and to challenge the certainties of racial categorization. (shrink)

Sale of Sperm, Health Records, Minimally Conscious States, and Duties of Candour Content Type Journal Article Category Recent Developments Pages 7-14 DOI 10.1007/s11673-011-9347-6 Authors Cameron Stewart, Centre for Health Governance, Law and Ethics, Sydney Law School, University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia 2006 Bernadette Richards, Law School, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, SA, Australia 5005 Richard Huxtable, Centre for Ethics in Medicine, University of Bristol, Bristol, BS8 1TH UK Bill Madden, School of Law, University of Western Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia Tina (...) Cockburn, School of Law, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, QLD, Australia Journal Journal of Bioethical Inquiry Online ISSN 1872-4353 Print ISSN 1176-7529 Journal Volume Volume 9 Journal Issue Volume 9, Number 1. (shrink)

Le milieu universitaire, précisément le monde des enseignants-chercheurs, se trouve dans la nécessité absolue de s’approprier les nouvelles technologies de l’information ; en même temps, il est l’héritier d’habitudes épistémologiques séculaires. Cet article pose la question des pratiques présentes et émergentes dans les processus de documentation scientifique. Il s’agit d’une part de constater les éventuelles carences dénoncées par les chercheurs en matière d’accès à l’information, d’autre part de faire émerger tout un système de représentations sociales participant d’une culture informationnelle spécifique (...) influençant nécessairement les pratiques. Sur la base d’une analyse qualitative, nous mettons en évidence la nécessité, pour les chercheurs, quelle que soit leur discipline, de maintenir une relation « papier » avec les supports d’information. Cette relation traditionnelle permet de mieux appréhender l’innovation technique et de faire face aux potentialités offertes par les nouvelles sources d’accès à l’information. En outre, nous montrons que la définition même du métier de chercheur et son comportement face au traitement de l’information dépend de sa culture disciplinaire, selon qu’il appartient aux sciences humaines et sociales ou aux « sciences dures ».The university environment, where scholars and professors work, is faced with an imperative need to appropriate the new information technologies, but it has also inherited the epistemological habits of centuries. This article raises the question of current and emerging practices in the scientific documentation process. It seeks on the one hand to observe the failings exposed by researchers regarding access to information, and on the other hand to draw out the contours of a whole system of social representations relating to a specific information culture that necessarily influences practice. Based on a qualitative analysis, we show the need for researchers in any discipline to maintain « print » relationships with information media. This traditional relationship helps to gain a better grasp of technical innovation and to cope with the potential of new ways of accessing information. We also show that the very definition of the research profession, as well as researchers’ attitudes to information processing, depend on their disciplinary culture and whether they belong to the humanities and social sciences or to the « hard sciences ». (shrink)

"I shall here present my life," writes Descartes in Discourse on Method, "as in a painting" and my method "as a fable." Through the Eyes of Descartes demonstrates how a Cartesian aesthetics is interwoven in his thought. It brings together a variety of materials: his metaphysical writings and essays in natural philosophy, through to his letters, drawings, and printed images. Cecilia Sjöholm and Marcia Sá Cavalcante Schuback seek to bring Descartes into dialogue with contemporary phenomenology as well as contemporary psychoanalytic (...) thought. They focus on how perception interacts with emotions and thought, and the way in which our gaze is directed toward limit-phenomena of beauty and fascination. In Through the Eyes of Descartes, Cecilia Sjöholm and Marcia Sá Cavalcante Schuback counter the traditional picture of Descartes by presenting his work in an entirely different light: a Descartes of the arts, of sensibility, of inner images, and of imagination. (shrink)

Le 'Dictionaire historique et critique' de Pierre Bayle est depuis longtemps considéré comme un des ouvrages clés qui a non seulement effectué une influence importante à l'époque de sa parution, mais aussi sur le siècle des Lumières par la suite. Le présent ouvrage examine, dans un premier temps, le dictionnaire en tant que genre littéraire et fait ressortir les particularités du 'Dictionaire historique et critique.' Dans un deuxième temps, on s'intéresse à la question de savoir comment des aspects formels du (...) texte baylien permettent à l'auteur de propager des argumentations sceptiques. Par ce moyen, le rapport entre la forme et le contenu devient visible. Dans un troisième temps, on s'interroge au même rapport entre la forme et le contenu mais en considérant la dimension historiographique de Pierre Bayle. Par cette étude, il devient possible de montrer que l'auteur se munit de différents outils de travail intellectuel pour faire part de sa pensée en choisissant le dictionnaire comme genre pour son texte."--Page 4 of printed paper wrapper. (shrink)

Andalusia, the Maghreb, and North Africa have played important roles in Islamic history regarding Qurān memorization and writing. These regions have contributed significantly to Qurānic recitation methods. The expertise of Maghrebi scholars is evident in modern Qurān printing, which often ref-erences their work. This expertise partly stems from a traditional wooden board-based memorization method used for centuries. This study examines the wooden board Qurān memorization tradition in the Maghreb and North Africa. It explores the history and educational process of (...) this method, which began with Islam's spread in the region. The study also describes Qurānic education institutions in the area. The research outlines three main stages of the memorization process and explains different applications of the method. It highlights the characteristics of the wooden board-centered approach, including how it combines visual and auditory learning, recitation to a teacher (ardh), listening (samā'), and writing. The study discusses the bene-fits of starting memorization from the end of the Qurān and how this meth-od aligns with multiple intelligence theory. It also examines 'tanzel' and 'an-sas' practices, which connect memorization to Qurānic orthography. Addi-tionally, the study describes the educational materials used in traditional memorization and explores their symbolic meaning in the regional religious and cultural context. The research uses comparative analysis and literature review methods. (shrink)

Reclamation is usually taken to be the phenomenon wherein in-groups employ a slur to express pride, foster camaraderie, or subvert discriminatory structures. We provide data showing that, under some special circumstances, out-groups successfully reclaim slurs too. Thus, the mainstream restriction to in-groups is merely an approximation of the correct extension of the phenomenon – of who does actually reclaim slurs. Removing any such stipulative restriction opens a path towards further theorizing into the nature of reclamation.

What different relativist claims about a given domain are to be distinguished? Which of them is best placed to account for intuitive facts about disagreement in that domain? In a recent paper in this journal, ‘Indexical Relativism versus Genuine Relativism’ (2004), Max Kölbel distinguishes two forms of relativism, andargues that one of them, indexical relativism, faces problems in accounting for disagreement. In the first part of this discussion I present my own taxonomy of relativist positions in a given domain, which (...) is based on David Lewis’s 1980 essay, and I compare it with Kölbel’s and other recent suggestions. In the second part, I argue that the presuppositional defence of indexical relativism against related objections that I have elaborated elsewhere is also effective against Kölbel’s recent charges. (shrink)

Reponse to Peter Milne (2005)'s argument agaist maximalism about truthmaking.

There are certain metaphysically interesting arguments ‘from vagueness’, for unrestricted mereological composition and for four-dimensionalism, which involve a claim to the effect that idioms for unrestricted quantification are precise. An elaboration of Lewis’ argument for this claim, which assumes the view of vagueness as semantic indecision, is presented. It is argued that the argument also works according to other views on the nature of vagueness, which also require for an expression to be vague that there are different admissible alternatives of (...) the relevant sort, such as epistemicism, as defended by Williamson. Recent attempts to resist the argument are discussed and rejected. (shrink)

Technische Innovationen der Fotografie erlaubten Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts, Wildtiere nicht mehr nur als Kadaver und Beute oder in Studio und Gehege abzulichten, sondern ihnen in ihrem natürlichen Habitat nachzuspüren. Die frühe Wildtierfotografie bediente damit ein populäres Interesse an der als lokal, national oder kolonial geschätzten Fauna, lieferte wichtige Beiträge zur zoologischen Forschung und verstand sich häufig als Vorkämpfer des Naturschutzes. Ganz neu stellte sich damit aber auch die Frage, wie man Tiere richtig fotografiert: technisch, ästhetisch, ethisch. ​Der Band beantwortet (...) diese Fragen in historischer Perspektive und erschließt damit das Forschungsfeld der Wildtierfotografie. (shrink)

The paper proposes and defends the following characterization of response dependent property: a property is response-dependent iff there is a response-dependence biconditional for a concept signifying it which holds in virtue of the nature of the property. Finding out whether a property is such is to a large extent a posteriori matter. Finally, colors are response dependent: they are essentially tied to issuing the relevant experiences, so that having those experiences does give access to their, dispositional, nature. Finally, some important (...) contrary views are critically discussed in the paper. (shrink)

Some philosophers seem to think that borderline cases provide further cases of apparent faultless disagreement. My aim here is to argue against such a suggestion. I claim that with respect to borderline cases, people typically do not respond by taking a view—unlike what is the case in genuine cases of apparent faultless disagreement. I argue that my claim is indeed respected and actually accounted for by paradigm cases of semantic and epistemic views on the nature of vagueness. And I also (...) argue that my claim turns out to be, initial appearances notwithstanding, compatible with other claims in the literature—to the effect that, in appropriate circumstances, there are indeed, or there might well be, “macho,” admissible, forced, and hesitant responses to borderline cases. (shrink)

Timothy Williamson famously offered an argument from these Tarskian principles in favor of bivalence. I show, dwelling on (Andjelkovic & Williamson, 2000), that the argument depends on a contentious formulation of the Tarskian principles about truth (and falsity), which the supervaluationist can reject without jeopardizing the Tarskian insight. In the mentioned paper, Adjelkovic and Williamson argue that, even if the appropriate formulation seems to make room for failure of bivalence in borderline cases, this appearance is illusory, once one grants an (...) independent further principle involving biconditionals. I finally argue that the formulation of this is, however, contentious in a similar manner. (shrink)

O tradicional problema do conhecimento do singular mantém-se hoje em dia: o impasse assinalado por Aristóteles prevalece na maioria das ciências actuais que lidam precisamente com casos particulares, contingentes, imprevisíveis, que escapam ao enquadramento nos modelos categoriais. Este Colóquio sobre O Estatuto do Singular constituiu um desafio para todos aqueles que em diversas áreas filosóficas e científicas se enfrentam com a necessidade de repensar modelos e estratégias aplicáveis ao caso prático, à decisão, à acção, à inovação, à invenção; noções como (...) o incerto, o provável, o casual, o frequente, o diferente, o imprevisível - exigem um novo modo de pensar e uma revisão das formas típicas da racionalidade. O tópico convocou, além da filosofia, uma ampla gama de domínios: desde as ciências e artes médicas, a biologia, até ao direito e às ciências humanas e sociais, passando também pela literatura e a arte. O que se pretendeu foi apresentar uma sinopse de diferentes olhares e perspectivas sobre um ponto de mira comum: «o estatuto do singular» foi o leit motiv para abrir um horizonte de pensamento e de diálogo profícuo e abrangente. (shrink)

The Sciences of the Qurʾān contain information about the process of Qurʾān and its structural characteristics, language and stylistic features, as well as statistical data on the content of the Qurʾān. This information, which contributes significantly to the understanding of the Qurʾān, is generally classified within the relevant narratives and the classifications are sometimes associated with verses. In this context, the way in which the Sciences of the Qurʾān explain the verses, which do not act solely on methodical premises, differs (...) from the Qurʾānic exegesis books. In the Sciences of the Qurʾān, the subject of revelation forms are classified within the frame of the narrations, and the 51st verse of the Sūrat al-Shūrā is frequently referred to. In other words, the related classifications are matched with the 51st verse of the Sūrat al-Shūrā. In the exegesis, this verse is handled more comprehensively considering its context and the literal possibilities. There are two remarkable comments about this verse in terms of its reflection in the revelation classifications. However, on the contrary, it is possible to encounter examples where the verse is subject to specific discussions. One of them belongs to Jār Allāh al-Zamakhsharī (d.538/1144) and the other to Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Bayḍāwī (d. 685/1286). When the exegesis of al-Zamakhsharī and al-Bayḍāwī are examined, it is seen that this verse is the subject of ru’yat Allah (seeing Allah) discussion between Muʿtazila and Ahl al-Sunnah and the classifications are made in this context. However, it is interesting to note that the classification of al-Zamakhsharī is more suitable for the perspective of the Sciences of the Qurʾān. In this study, the codes of the determinations made by al-Zamakhsharī and al-Bayḍāwī related to the 51st verse of Sūrat al-Shūrā was read on the commentaries. While al-Zamakhsharī explains this verse as a proof for the argument that God cannot be seen, al-Bayḍāwī develops an example of reactionary interpretation upon Zamakhsharī’s view. The Sciences of the Qurʾān (as a discipline), which opens a separate title to the ways of revelation, uses this verse as a template and takes it away from the discussion. In the study, the subjective dimensions of the discussion and classifications made in the context of this verse were evaluated. As a result, it is concluded that a classification similar to classification of al-Zamakhsharī has been made in the literature of the Sciences of the Qurʾān as it provides more comprehensive framework. Summary: During the period of revelation of the Holy Qurʾān not only the sunnah and actions of the Prophet which explained the Holy Qurʾān, but also various sources of information based on language and consultation, were used in order to understand the Holy Qurʾān. The first people introduced to the revelation used their own language/oratory skills, which were natural them, to understand the Qurʾān and were also able to observe the events and problems that brought about the revelation of the verses. These elements, used by those first people for understanding the Qurʾān, were readily available in their society. Therefore, understanding of the Qurʾān while the Prophet was still alive did not require a codification of those resources or treatment of the matter on a theoretical level. Subsequent generations mostly compensated the lack of those advantages by the use of the Sciences of the Qurʾān books penned individually after 2nd Century (A.H.), and those written systematically under the collective name "the Sciences of the Qurʾān" starting from the 6th century (A.H.). These works covered many subjects such as the beginning of the revelation, the accentuation of the Qurʾān, the physical development process of the Qurʾānic text, information based on observation as well as the tone and content of the Qurʾān and provided information details for Qurʾānic interpretations. Over time, this information was classified in the Sciences of the Qurʾān literature, organized under various relevant titles and enhanced with examples, numerical and qualitative information. One of the main topics of the Sciences of the Qurʾān is the subject of “revelation and its forms”. In the literature of the Sciences of the Qurʾān, the classifications made under this topic are generally associated with the verse 51 of Sūrat al-Shūrā. In this verse, the forms of communication between Allah (Jalla Jalaluhu) and the servant/prophet are categorized. The context of the verse 51 of the Sūrat al-Shūrā in the tafsīr literature is different from the context in the Sciences of the Qurʾān literature. As a matter of fact, while this verse is examined in detail with respect to the context, concept analysis, and the possibilities of i‘rāb (classical Arabic grammar), it is merely referred to in the Sciences of the Qurʾān. This is due to the fact that the determinations and classifications made in the Sciences of the Qurʾān are shaped mostly in the light of the historical context and narrations of the subject.It is also possible to encounter examples of tafsīr where the 51st verse is made the topic of detailed discussions. There are two remarkable comments about this verse in terms of its reflection in the revelation classifications. One of them belongs to Jār Allāh al-Zamakhsharī (d.538/1144) and the other belongs to Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Bayḍāwī (d. 685/1286). The tafsīr s of al-Zamakhsharī and al-Bayḍāwī make it clear that this verse is the subject of ru’yat Allah discussion between the Muʿtazila and Ahl al-Sunnah and the classifications are made accordingly. The fact that i‘rāb examinations of the two authors are similar and both took into account other linguistic possibilities despite their preferences, which also prove that the points of conflict are not literal. Al-Zamakhsharī thinks that this verse determines the way Allah speaks not only with his prophets but also with all people. According to al-Zamakhsharī, the 51st verse refers to the three forms of communication that takes place between God and any of His servants. Allah communicates with His servants; a) through inspiration, inspiration to heart or through dreams, b) by making His words heard through certain channels, c) by sending one of his angels as a messenger. In the verse, the first is expressed as revelation, the second is to speak behind a veil, and the third is to send a messenger. According to al-Zamakhsharī, Allah's inspiration to the mother of Moses, the dream that He showed to Abraham regarding the sacrificing of his son and inspiration of Psalms to David, all relate to the revelation concept mentioned in the first option. Al-Zamakhsharī believes that revelation from behind a veil is an adage. This adage can be compared to a king speaking with one of those at his service behind a veil/curtain, where the person hears the voice of the king but cannot see him. Allah only spoke to Moses and angels in that manner, and sent angels to speak to His other servants/prophets.As a response to al-Zamakhsharī, al-Bayḍāwī interpreted the verse concisely explaining the 'revelation' (وحيا) as a secret word that is quickly understood. Because, in terms of its nature, revelation is not a word made up of sound waves that come one after another to make words. In the verse, this word refers both to the Night Journey (Mi‘rāj) and the talk mentioned in the hadiths regarding the ru’yat Allah, and Allah speaking to Moses without Moses seeing Allah. However, in the verse min verâi ḥicâb/attributed to the word 'revelation 'من وراء حجاب makes it clear that the expression refers to a form of speech in which Allah is heard but not seen. Therefore, the word 'revelation' refers to a mutual talk and according to al-Bayḍāwī, this is proof that ru’yat Allah is possible. The fact that the classifications made in the Sciences of the Qurʾān literature agrees with the classification of al-Zamakhsharī, not al-Bayḍāwī. This result is closely related to the structural features of the Sciences of the Qurʾān in which authors strive to make general explanations that are beyond sectarian preferences and views. Understanding the verse as a conversation between Allah and man, and not between Allah and His prophet, provides a more comprehensive classification in terms of the use of revelations (not only the use of the word revelation) in the Qurʾān. Thus, the address that was made to Abraham in his dream, the revelation of to Moses' mother, and inspiration to our holy Prophet and other people can be interpreted according to this verse. In addition, the ru’yat Allah debate was excluded from the subject in the classifications made in the Sciences of the Qurʾān and implication of the verse was limited to the talks made in a worldly manner. (shrink)

This paper is a new defense of the view that visual hallucinations lack content. The claim is that visual hallucinations are illusory not because their content is nonveridical, but rather because they seem to represent when they fail to represent anything in the first place. What accounts for the phenomenal character of visual experiences is not the content itself, but rather the vehicle of content, that is, not the properties represented by visual experience, but rather the relational properties of experience (...) of representing singular contents, namely particular instantiations of properties. I argue that the Russellian particular-involving proposition is the only appropriate model for the representational content of visual experience and hence that visual hallucinations are just like failed demonstrations. (shrink)

Resumo: Neste trabalho discute-se a crítica de István Mészáros à Lógica de Hegel. Aponta-se como o marxismo realiza a crítica aos pontos de partida e de chegada da Ciência da lógica, quais sejam, o pensamento sem pressupostos e o círculo auto-constituído da Lógica. Com isso, indica-se a diferença entre os modos hegeliano e marxista de conceber o enraizamento do conhecimento no processo de vida real. Discute-se ainda como István Mészáros realizou uma dura crítica à hipostasiação do método dialético em G. (...) Lukács, crítica esta que se apóia na rejeição de um método que deixa de prestar contas ao ser e que, por isso, acaba lidando com a identidade entre conhecimento e ser como uma mera postulação abstrata.: This paper discusses István Mészáros critique of Hegel’s Logic. We point out how Marxism criticizes the presuppositionless thinkingand self-constituted circle of reasoning of the Science of logic. We thereby show the difference between the Hegelian and Marxist ways of conceiving the rooting of knowledge in the process of real life. We also discuss how Mészáros made a scathing critique of the hypostatization of dialectical method in Lukács work. This critique is based on the rejection of a method that fails to be accountable to the real world and therefore ends up treating the identity of knowledge and being as a mere abstract postulation. (shrink)

Comprehensive work on Yoga philosophy; includes complete Sanskrit text with Hindi verse translation of Yogasutra of Patañjali.

God (Islam); Islam; doctrines; apologetic work.

Classical work on logic by a Muslim scholar ; includes comments and explanations by Sheikh Muḥammad ʻAbduh, edited and introduced by a modern scholar.